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Abstract 
Coming to terms with recent insights concerning the (post-) political is a key challenge for 
transition management. To start with, transition management understands the relation 
transition initiatives adopt towards existing regimes not in political, but in market terms. This 
impacts their internal processes, which are based on a deliberative notion of democracy, 
assuming the existence of a common good and misrecognizing the constitutive role of 
conflict. Moreover, transition management embraces a governance approach centring on 
public–private bodies which, in the name of bottom-up processes and participation, especially 
gives a voice to a privileged group of business, policy and civil society actors. Insofar as 
citizens get a place, it is merely in their role as consumers. Finally, as it is based on a market 
model itself, transition management fails to politicize one of the most fundamental current 
‘landscape’ elements. The crucial question is how these features affect transition 
management's possibilities to contribute to effective and democratic sustainable change. 
 
Key Words: Sustainability, Transition management, Post-politics, Democracy, Deliberation, 
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1. Introduction 
 
Particularly in Belgium and the Netherlands, but also in other countries, transition management 
has fast become a ‘hype’ as one of the most promising ways to bring about a transition to a 
more sustainable society. Given the context of growing ecological awareness, but 
disappointment about the limited results achieved so far, this should maybe not come as a 
surprise. Long-standing environmental movements, but also traditional forms of policy making 
have been experiencing a kind of ‘backlash’ during the previous decennia - in the sense that 
they have been increasingly considered to be inappropriate to tackle the challenges we are 
confronted with today. This resulted on the one hand in a growing scepticism with regard to the 
possibilities to avoid ecological catastrophe, and on the other hand in the emergence of new 
initiatives to deal with the current crises in innovative ways. Given that proponents of transition 
management explicitly distance themselves from ‘old’ models of thinking and practicing 
change, and put forward a new approach instead, it is probably not unexpected that the model 
is enthusiastically embraced by a broad range of sustainability actors. Indeed, transition 
management evokes hope again by filling a gap. 
  
But there is more: as Rotmans, Loorbach and Kemp (Rotmans et al., 2007) state: ‘[i]n 
fact, the shortcomings of earlier generations of environmental policies were made explicit in 
light of the call for a new approach’. In other words: it is not only that the loss of credibility of 
the ‘old’ models of change opened the door for new approaches such as transition management, 
the proclamation of a ‘new’ approach also made ‘other’ approaches look ‘old’. It was thus partly 
by distancing itself from other attempts to tackle the ecological crises that transition 
management succeeded in putting itself on the agenda. But how ‘new’ is transition 
management? How should its discourse on this terrain be understood? To which extent does it 
indeed bring hope for effective change? And will it also be capable of realising this change in 
a democratic way? 
 
Transition management developed a discourse relying on concepts such as adaptive 
governance, reflexivity, complexity, long-term thinking, multi-actor, multilevel systems, social 
learning and network management (Kemp and Loorbach, 2003; Loorbach, 2002, 2007, 2010; 
Loorbach et al., 2008; Rotmans and Loorbach, 2009; Rotmans et al., 2007; Sondeijker et al., 
2006). Other approaches are criticised for not taking these key innovative insights and concepts 
into account. Interestingly, this criticism is levelled both against regulatory environmental 
policies and classical liberal market approaches. As Derk Loorbach (2010) states: ‘both top-
down steering by government […] and the liberal free market approach […] are outmoded as 
effective management mechanisms to generate sustainable solutions at the societal level’ [our 
emphasis]. He adds: ‘but it is at the same time impossible to govern societal change without 
them’ (see also Loorbach, 2002; Loorbach, 2010, p. 162; Sondeijker et al., 2006). According to 
Loorbach, governments should leave behind the idea that they can tackle the complex problems 
we are confronted with ‘alone’ (Loorbach, 2002, p. 1). Therefore, he argues that ‘new modes 
of governance’ have to be sought (Loorbach, 2010, p. 161-162). Other important elements of 
transition management are its plea for a more ‘reflexive’ approach (Rotmans et al., 2001a), the 
idea that sustainable development should not be considered as an end goal, but rather as a 
continuous process, and that policy objectives therefore should not be ‘set in stone’ (Loorbach, 
2007). Finally, reflexive long term thinking is advocated based on the idea that complex societal 
problems cannot be solved by achieving quick results through the development of a blueprint 
with fixed criteria (Loorbach, 2007; Rotmans et al., 2001a).  
These are all valuable reflections as such. However, the key questions are whether the 
transition model that is developed on this basis succeeds in fulfilling its promises and what are 
the consequences of these choices on other terrains. As we will argue in this article, to fully 
understand its merits, but also its limitations, we have to situate transition management in its 
broader social, economic and especially ‘political’ context. This context is increasingly 
diagnosed by contemporary political theorists as post-political, and many of its main 
characteristics also relate to the core of transition management. Indeed, a number of criticisms 
which have arisen against transition management can be conceptualised through the lenses of 
these theories of the political, as they all relate to the fact that transition management does not 
take the ‘political’ reality of society enough into account. 
In what follows, we will first introduce transition management and discuss why it 
triggers so much enthusiasm. In a second instance, we will briefly introduce the work of 
political theorists such as Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, Jacques Rancière and Slavoj Žižek, 
focusing in particular on Mouffe’s writings. In the subsequent section we will argue that 
transition management bears the hallmark of current ‘post-political tendencies’, and why this 
critique of post-politics (or (de)politicisation) challenges its core. The following elements will 
be explored. To start with, relying on a deliberative model of democracy, transition 
management fails to fully acknowledge power relations, radical pluralism and from the possibly 
constitutive role of conflict in society. In so far as conflict gets a place, it is framed as a market-
  
oriented instrument stimulating innovation. Secondly, transition management can be 
understood as a specific variant of an ongoing tendency towards ‘governance’, which, in a guise 
of bottom-up processes and participation, risks to redistribute power from what should be ‘all 
citizens’ towards non-elected groups of ‘important’ business and civil society actors. The 
implication of this is that ‘the people’ do not get a place as possible actors of change in this 
transition process. Sometimes, they are taken into consideration in their role as consumers, but 
even that is not always the case. Thirdly, as it is based on a market model, transition 
management presents one of the most fundamental current ‘landscape’ elements (the neoliberal 
political economy) as neutral, thus obscuring its political nature.  
This paper aims to unravel the (post-)political in transition management. The challenge 
transition management is confronted with, we will argue, is to come to terms with recent 
insights concerning the political, which is of crucial importance if we want to lay out effective 
and democratic pathways towards change. 
 
 
2. Transition management 
 
Transition management is often understood as the policy application of transition theory, which, 
starting from a multi-level perspective, considers transitions as the product of the interaction 
between several levels: the regime, niche and landscape level (Geels, 2002, 2005b). The theory 
states that transitions take place when radical niche innovations break through and succeed in 
changing the existing regime (Geels, 2010; Geels and Schot, 2007; Raven, 2005; Raven et al., 
2011). The crucial question is therefore what the conditions are for niches to break through, or, 
in other words, why some niches ‘make it’ and others do not (Paredis, 2009). This would be 
partly related to the maturity of the niche, but also to elements which are external to it (Geels, 
2004a, 2004b, 2005a; Hoogma et al., 2002; Raven et al., 2010). Innovations which arise in 
niches become more easily a success if they can hook on to developments in the regime and/or 
landscape level. For instance, ‘climate change’ can be seen as a change on the landscape level 
which will possibly put pressure on the current mobility, food, energy and housing systems. In 
this way, ‘windows of opportunity’ can arise for innovations such as zero energy houses or 
solar panels to break through (Geels, 2004a; 2004b, p. 37; 2005a). But opportunities can also 
emerge within a regime itself, especially when the internal logic of a regime is getting disturbed 
(Geels, 2002; Geels, 2004a). For example, the car only gives freedom and comfort as long as 
not everyone has one, as traffic jams subvert these advantages. The regime of the car becomes 
disturbed by the traffic jams, which can provide a window of opportunity for innovations such 
as electric bikes. In this way, internal developments within the regime co-evolve and can 
facilitate the breakthrough of innovative niches.  
At first sight, these insights seem more than promising in the context of the pursuit of 
sustainability. Indeed, are we today not in a situation of landscape pressure (e.g., climate 
change), internal tensions within a number of regimes (e.g., traffic jams) and promising niches 
(e.g., electric bikes)? Transition management can have a stimulating effect to the extent that it 
shows that several crucial transition factors are already present today and can be relied upon to 
shape the urgently needed change. Furthermore, if we can understand how transitions happen, 
it should maybe not be so difficult to steer them a bit more consciously and pro-actively? The 
idea behind transition management is that through the study of how transitions happened in the 
past, a model can be developed on how transitions can be steered in the future, this time in view 
of realising sustainable change. If change is to happen, so proponents of transition management 
argue,  it does not ‘erupt’ as a revolution, but it is rather a matter of ‘carefully chosen 
incremental steps’ which lead to ‘evolutionary’ change (Kemp and Loorbach, 2003; Kemp et 
al., 2007b).  
  
 
But this is not the only element which makes transition management sound promising in many 
people’s ears. Transition management relies on the conviction that, if approached in a well-
considered way, a broad range of actors from different societal backgrounds can achieve 
consensus about the urgency of the problems at stake and about the related long-term goals to 
be realised (Kemp and Loorbach, 2003, p. 10). As Loorbach and Rotmans (Loorbach and 
Rotmans, 2006, p. 10) explain, transition management allows for ‘diversity and informed 
dissent in the short term’, while at the same time it opts ‘for consensus on long-term 
sustainability goals’. In order to achieve this, transition management takes an outspokenly 
deliberative approach to collective decision-making. Indeed, it starts from the conviction that if 
a benevolent framework of dialogue is established, the pursuit of short-term or corporatist 
interests can be overcome, actors can be genuinely open for each other’s perspectives 
(Loorbach, 2002, p. 6), learn from each other (Loorbach, 2007) and generate innovative and 
refreshing ideas (Sondeijker et al., 2006) in view of long-term sustainability. For instance, Jan 
Rotmans and his colleagues have defined transition management as ‘a deliberative process to 
influence governance activities in such a way that they lead to accelerated change directed 
towards sustainability ambitions’ (Rotmans et al., 2007, p. 239). 
One of the key ideas underpinning this approach is that the ‘confrontation between 
different perspectives […] might lead to alternative “out of the box” solutions’ (van der Brugge 
and Rotmans, 2007, p. 262). In this way, new and innovative approaches would be arrived at. 
To make that possible, setting up creative processes of exchange and dialogue between a 
carefully selected range of societal actors is key. As Loorbach (2007, p. 118) explains, ‘it is 
important that there are an equal number of forerunners from the societal pentagon: 
government, companies, non-governmental organisations, knowledge institutes and 
intermediaries’. Transition management thus relies on a participatory multi-actor governance 
model (Boulanger, 2008; Loorbach, 2002, 2007; Loorbach and Rotmans, 2006; Loorbach et al., 
2008; Rotmans et al., 2001a; van der Brugge and Rotmans, 2007; Van der Brugge et al., 2005). 
More concretely, a ‘transition process’ starts with bringing together a number of 
‘innovators and visionaries’ (Loorbach and Rotmans, 2006, p. 9) in a ‘small innovation network 
of selected frontrunners’ (Loorbach et al., 2009, p. 5), called a transition arena. The process 
begins by developing an ‘image of a desired future system state’ (Loorbach, 2007, p. 118) or 
Leitbild (Dierkes et al 1992 in Loorbach, 2007). When a consensus on this long-term guiding 
vision is reached, a multiplicity of possible transition pathways is elaborated. The subsequent 
process is conceived in such a way as to remain as open as possible. Rather than choosing one 
pathway early in the process, different transition experiments are launched that can possibly 
become the starting points for these transition trajectories (Loorbach, 2002, 2007; Loorbach 
and Rotmans, 2006; Rotmans and Loorbach, 2009; Sondeijker et al., 2006). More in particular, 
transition experiments are supposed to develop into interesting ‘niches’. The expectation is that 
if these niches succeed in breaking through, a transition process is set off.  
The deliberative model of democracy, from which transition management clearly 
borrows a number of key concepts, was originally developed by the renowned philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas (1984). According to this approach, the ideal of a democratic society is one 
where consensus is sought through dialogue. This consensus can be reached through an ideal 
speech situation, in which only the better argument counts, strategic games and considerations 
of power are invalid, and everyone is open to each other’s claims. This model of democracy 
should be distinguished from what is called an aggregative model of democracy (Tinnevelt, 
2003). The latter conceives of democracy as a method to aggregate previously existing 
individual or group interests through procedures such as voting or negotiation. We will come 
back to this discussion on democracy below.  
  
In a relatively short lapse of time, quite a number of transition processes have been 
launched following this approach. In the Netherlands, transition arenas have been set up 
focusing on energy (Kemp et al., 2007b; Rotmans et al., 2001a), water management (van der 
Brugge and Rotmans, 2007; Van der Brugge et al., 2005), waste management (Kemp et al., 
2007a), transportation (Brown et al., 2004; Elzen et al., 2004; Kemp and Rotmans, 2004), 
agriculture (Poppe et al., 2009) and healthcare (Hegger et al., 2007; Kivisaari et al., 2004). In 
Flanders, transition arenas were launched related to sustainable living and building (DuWoBo), 
sustainable material management (Plan C) (Paredis, 2010, 2011), sustainable agriculture, next 
to an atypical transition arena composed of civil society actors. 
However, while actors from different backgrounds enthusiastically embrace this new 
and promising model, both sympathetic and more stringent criticisms have emerged (Avelino, 
2009; Meadowcroft, 2009; Shove and Walker, 2007). A number of these criticisms can be 
summarised by stating that transition management does not take the ‘political’ reality of society 
enough into account, and as a result risks to fail to realise its promises. A number of political 
theorists have described our current era as post-political or as characterised by deep forms of 
depoliticisation (Mouffe, 2006; Žižek, 2000), and transition management does not seem to 
easily escape this condition. In the next paragraph, we will briefly explain what is meant by 
‘the post-political’ in order to subsequently relate this concept to the discussion on transition 
management. 
 
 
3. The (post-)political and its tenets  
 
A number of scholars have developed critical analyses of transition management, whereby they 
sometimes come close to diagnosing its post-political thrust, without, however, fully bringing 
to bear the critique of post-politics or the loss of ‘the political’ as developed today in political 
theory (see further). It is our conviction that looking through the lenses of these theories of the 
political can yield a more precise diagnosis of both the merits and difficulties which transition 
management is confronted with.  
‘The political’ is a complex term, which is given different meanings by different 
scholars, such as Chantal Mouffe (2006), Slavoj Žižek (2000) and Jacques Rancière (2006). In 
order to circumscribe the concept more precisely, we will especially make use of the path-
breaking work of Chantal Mouffe, which is particularly relevant as she has formulated a 
trenchant critique of the deliberative approach to democracy which is central to transition 
management. 
In order to fully grasp what ‘the political’ is about, the concept has to be clearly 
distinguished from that of ‘politics’. This latter notion refers to the institutions such as the 
parliament or voting, or more in general, to a specific social sphere which we usually call 
politics (Mouffe, 2006). ‘The political’, in contrast, refers to a discourse in which the existence 
of power, conflict, and contingency is recognised. The importance of this latter term is that it 
makes it possible to conceptualise ‘depoliticisation’ as the ‘loss’ of ‘the political’. Indeed, there 
will always be politics as a specific sphere where decisions are made and new laws and rules 
are produced. But this activity, and society at large, are not always necessarily understood in 
political terms. Technocratic discourses, for example, fail to acknowledge the contingent and 
contestable nature of decisions taken in the sphere of politics. They tend to portray the act of 
governing as neutral, or as scientifically grounded, thus making invisible that we are always 
dealing with the exercise of power in a context of potential disagreement.  
From this perspective, Mouffe (2006), but also Žižek (2000) and Rancière (2006) 
analyse current society as post-political (or post-democratic in the case of Rancière) to the 
extent that it is pervaded by a kind of consensus thinking and a technical and managerial 
  
attitude. These tend to overlook the reality of power and decision and to downplay the existence 
of conflict and debate about the way society is organised and about multiple future possibilities 
and different strategies to reach these. The reason why the recognition of the political is so 
important, according to these scholars, is that this recognition is a crucial feature of democracy. 
Democracy, so it is stated, starts by making power, conflict and decision visible and contestable. 
As Mouffe argues, ‘(t)he main question of democratic politics becomes then not how to 
eliminate power, but how to constitute forms of power which are compatible with democratic 
values’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 22).  
This diagnosis is of utmost importance for the evaluation of transition management and 
its potential to realise sustainability change. Indeed, despite its often radical discourse, 
transition management seems to bear the hallmark of what is considered a ‘post-political 
consensus’. As the misrecognition of the political dimension can not only undermine the 
democratic nature, but also the effectiveness of transition processes, it is of crucial importance 
to investigate this issue. 
 
 
 
4. The (post-)political in transition management 
 
4.1. Consensus, pluralism and the constitutive role of conflict 
 
In his defence of the novel democratic credentials of transition management, Loorbach argues 
that ‘(p)arliamentary democracies, political institutions and assemblies are solidified units and 
categories that were useful at times of relatively clear ideological contradictions and societal 
divisions (labour, capital, (…)). Societal problems and solutions were discussed and decided 
upon through ‘parliamentarised’ and ‘democratised’ political institutions (Loorbach et al., 
2013, p. 68, own translation from Dutch). This vision, Loorbach and his colleagues suggest, is 
running into its limits today. The classical, nation-state concepts and tools of democratic 
decision-making increasingly fail to effectively respond to contemporary complex challenges, 
including climate change and the other large-scale environmental crises. In order to address this 
deficiency, new forms of governing have been developing over the last decades, under the 
heading of ‘governance’. This novel term refers to a series of modes of steering and governing, 
whereby a broader range of societal actors, including private agents, cooperate in usually 
horizontal networks in order to address specific problems. Governance processes are often 
consensus-driven, relying on dialogue between qualitatively different actors, from governments 
to NGO’s and private enterprises. As Erik Swyngedouw shows, we are currently witnessing a 
broader societal tendency, whereby the act of governing is increasingly reconfigured into such 
‘a stakeholder-based arrangement of governance in which the traditional state forms (national, 
regional, or local government) partake together with experts, NGO’s, and other “responsible” 
partners’ (Swyngedouw, 2007). While inclusiveness and participation are key values of many 
governance systems, the question can be asked how representative and democratic these new 
forms of governance actually are.  
In what follows we will argue that, at least up to a certain degree, transition management 
can indeed be understood as a new form of governance, based on a consensus-driven multi-
actor model, as several scholars claim (Berkhout et al., 2004; Scrase and Smith, 2009; Smith 
and Stirling, 2010; Smith et al., 2005), and what implications follow from this assessment. 
Interestingly, transition management does explicitly depart from a traditional consensus model 
as is typically found in the Netherlands, and which relies on negotiations between social 
interests, especially workers and employers (Rotmans et al., 2007). As Rotmans argues, 
‘(c)onsensus democracy […] has an enormous ability to hinder and diminish creative power’ 
  
(Rotmans et al., 2007, p. 24). One of the reasons he mentions is the role of corporatism and the 
fact that especially vested interests are taken into account. According to him, the result is that 
‘innovative attempts at introducing reforms almost always fail’ (ibid.). 
In contrast, proponents of transition management aim at developing a conception of 
dialogue which is much more inclusive, encompassing and open. Loorbach and Rotmans 
(2006), Rotmans et al. (2007) and Loorbach (2007) stress that the start of a transition process 
should be kept as open as possible, creating a space for different visions and various possible 
transition pathways to exist next to each other. As they argue: ‘[i]n a sense, a transition agenda 
more or less needs a certain element of dissent, conflict and difference of opinion so that it 
facilitates innovation, competition and learning’ (Loorbach, 2007, p. 121)’. 
On the other hand, however, ‘[t]he objective obviously is to create consensus upon a 
long-term orientation and convergence in terms of action’ during the process (Loorbach, 2007, 
p. 118). This consensus consists of a shared conviction that structural change is needed and a 
shared view on the overall direction of this change (Kemp et al., 2007b).  As Loorbach (2007) 
argues, ‘(t)his consensus is mainly sought in terms of problem definition and long-term 
ambition, allowing for innovation and competition between ideas, options and agendas on the 
short-term. So although a consensus is sought on the long term, it drives on the involvement, 
innovation and creativity of individuals and organisations based on limited consensus’ 
(Loorbach, 2007, p. 88).  
In other words, transition management claims not to start from a given consensus but 
assumes that consensus on the overall goals will arrive if different actors are brought around 
the table and allow real dialogue and forms of inter-relational learning.  
Enabling this open and innovative dialogue is usually argued to be one of the first core 
aims of a transition arena, whereby different actors discuss in an informal and creative way 
about new options on how to accelerate a ‘transition’ and formulate a shared agenda (Loorbach, 
2007; Loorbach et al., 2009). For example, Loorbach (2007) attests how the Dutch Parkstad 
energy transition management project was the result of ‘learning-by-doing’ based on a 
‘structured and constructive dialogue’ between researchers and government officials 
(Loorbach, 2007, p. 224). Heiskanen and her colleagues (Heiskanen et al., 2009, p. 417) speak 
in this context about ‘a “discourse coalition” that temporarily shares a particular language’ 
which should be established through dialogue (Hajer 1995 in Kemp and Rotmans, 2009, p. 
305).  
Although the attempt to set up democratic experiments and adopt innovative methods 
of dialogue is surely relevant and valuable, we would like to raise three critical points 
concerning this approach. The first relates to the question how open a transition process really 
is, the second addresses the distinctive way transition management allows for conflict, while 
the third elaborates upon the limits of the specifically deliberative approach to democracy and 
collective decision-making.  
 
 
4.1.1. A natural consensus 
 
 
First, we argue that the openness of a transition process inevitably has its limits. While 
the process is kept open initially, and a consensus on key objectives is supposed only to arise 
after dialogue, the parameters of the resulting common vision, and especially the framework 
within which it should be implemented, are already determined in advance. As Loorbach states, 
transition management’s goal ‘is to come to an agreement or consensus on the desired future 
conditions and guiding principles. Paradoxically, in terms of transitions there is a natural 
consensus to be found at the overall level about the need for transition and the normative goal 
  
of sustainable development, while the actors may strongly disagree on preferred solutions or 
strategies on the short-term [our emphasis]’ (Loorbach, 2007, p. 143). Sometimes, specific 
choices are made to arrive more easily at such a natural consensus. As Grin (2012, p. 75), states, 
for example, these transition arena’s ‘tend to primarily involve actors who are a priori 
sympathetic to the idea of the transition.’  
In other words, the general aim is established already beforehand. But also the ‘tools’ 
or ‘methods’ to make decisions, and the ways considered appropriate for realising transitions  
are to a big extent already determined. Admittedly, transition management and the method of 
transition arenas still allow for some choice, but this is a choice within an already structured 
setting. Despite its claims to the opposite, transition management, like deliberative democracy 
as analysed by Amanda Machin, thus ‘presupposes the existence of one overarching conception 
of “the good”’ (Machin, 2013, p. 47). As she notices, the problem with such an ‘agreement on 
the common good [is that it] is antithetical to pluralism’. According to her ‘[t]here is no one 
‘rational’ path to take, no overarching grand green scheme that presents the solution. Both 
whether and how we act to combat climate change is a difficult political choice on which there 
will never be full agreement’ (p. 86). As she argues, ‘theories of deliberative democracy head 
down a dangerous path by denying the permanent presence of conflict’ (p. 86). 
Interestingly, some proponents of transition management not only acknowledge that 
conflicts will nevertheless arise, but even consider these conflicts as desirable in order to realise 
transition managements aims. To start with the ‘acknowledgement of conflict’: Loorbach 
(Loorbach, 2002, p. 7) describes the process that takes place in transition arenas as follows: 
‘Within the transition-arena, the participants first have to come to a mutual understanding of 
the transition-problem at hand and accordingly come to a shared problem-perception. In 
practice, this step is very difficult because of the conflicting perspectives of the actors involved 
and the different interests they have. Through an integral assessment of the problem, however, 
a certain level of agreement can be reached at least on the question whether or not there is an 
urgent problem.’ As is evident in this passage, conflict is recognised and given a place, 
however, it is considered as something which, on the level of general aims, can be ‘overcome’. 
In other words, this approach suggests ‘that by being brought into contact with each other in a 
deliberative forum, apparently conflictual perspectives can be transformed through reasoned 
discussion that aims at a horizon of democratic consensus’, even if this consensus takes a 
minimal form (Machin, 2013, p. 4).   
With regard to the ‘desirability’ of conflict, the following quote is telling: ‘(d)espite 
what several critics claim, transition management does not assume the need for consensus, but 
proposes the development of diverse sets of images and transition pathways’ (Rotmans and 
Loorbach 2010 in Grin, 2012, p. 84, emphasis in original). Indeed, as also Loorbach argues: 
‘[i]n a sense, a transition agenda more or less needs a certain element of dissent, conflict and 
difference of opinion so that it facilitates innovation, competition and learning’ (Loorbach, 
2007, p. 121)’. Conflict thus acquires a very specific meaning and aim. It is useful because and 
in so far as it facilitates innovation. Conflict is no longer specifically political, but acquires an 
economic thrust, as the last quote reveals: it contributes to broadening the market of ideas, it 
generates a peculiar type of competition and creates incentives for transition initiatives. As we 
will argue in what follows, transition management thus adds to the deliberative notion a market 
conception of what conflict can imply. 
 
 
4.1.2. The place of conflict 
 
Indeed, to  the extent that conflict is given a place, the central question is how the nature of the 
conflict is understood. Here we arrive at the second point. There are three possibilities. First, 
  
conflict can be viewed as a deficiency which results from mutual distrust or lack of reciprocal 
understanding, and which can thus be overcome through dialogue. As Loorbach suggests, for 
example, conflict can be the consequence of the confrontation ‘between strong individuals’ 
(Loorbach, 2007, p. 291). In other words, conflict then appears primarily as a (psychological?) 
obstacle that can be overcome, by establishing ‘[a] proper balance between niche- and regime-
actors’, by creating ‘optimal group dynamics’ and by building ‘trust’, to follow Loorbach. A 
second possibility is that disagreement entails a radical choice for one or another type of society, 
based on specific values. In other words, we are then confronted with a cleavage which is 
constitutive and cannot be overcome as such. This is what political conflict in essence is about 
(Mouffe, 2006). A third option, finally, is that conflict is rather viewed as something which 
ought to trigger creativity, stimulate the dialogue and enhance a competitive and challenging 
atmosphere. According to the latter view, a conflict can be instrumental in realising innovation.  
It is to be feared that transition management especially endorses the first and third view, 
rather than the second. To the extent that conflict is allowed, it ought to facilitate ‘innovation, 
competition and learning’ (Loorbach, 2007, p. 121). Conflict and competition between ideas, 
options and agendas are considered as something positive on the short-term, as long as it does 
not hamper the long-term consensus. Giving a place to conflict and disagreement then becomes 
a tool for enhancing the overall effectiveness of transition processes. The more fundamental 
value political theorists such as Chantal Mouffe attribute to conflict is thereby pushed aside. 
Indeed, according to her, acknowledging conflict as implying a real choice between forms of 
society, including models of democracy, is the condition of possibility of freedom (Mouffe, 
2000, p. 34). 
 
 
4.1.3. Deliberation and the free and equal subject 
 
Thirdly, the open process projected by transition management is typical for a vision of 
democracy that is deliberative in nature, which, as we argue, has its own limits. As already 
suggested, the type of democratic process taking place in transition arenas partakes of a 
deliberative view of democracy. It is distinguished from an aggregative model, and typically 
based on the presupposition that bringing actors together, enabling them to get to know each 
other better, and exchanging arguments will facilitate convergence and consensus-seeking. 
Actors can arrive at a common problem definition and long term goals through dialogue and by 
putting the common interest before personal interests and goals (Bergman et al., 2010; Berkhout 
et al., 2004; Meadowcroft, 2005). Chantal Mouffe recognises the importance of moving beyond 
an aggregative model of democracy, but finds fault with the way the deliberative model aims 
to do this: ‘by proposing to view reason and rational argumentation, rather than interest and 
aggregation of preferences as the central issue of politics, they simply replace the economic 
model with a moral one which - albeit in a different way - also misses the specificity of the 
political’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 46). 
In order to prevent any particular interests from dominating the governance process 
intended to realise sustainable change, proponents of transition management refer to the 
‘collective interest and cooperative orientation of participating actors’ (Voss et al., 2006, p. 
425). This is facilitated by the requirement that actors are asked to participate ‘on personal 
account rather than representing their home organisation or institution’, thus avoiding a focus 
on their own ‘vested interests’ (van der Brugge and Rotmans, 2007, p. 262). For Loorbach 
(2007, p. 143), the process of imagining a desired future leads to a new way of thinking and 
gives the actors involved confidence ‘that a common interest in undertaking a transition effort 
will develop’.  
  
One of the assumptions underlying this idea is that actors are ‘free’ and ‘equal’, that 
they are able to transcend their particular interests and goals, and are capable of ‘presenting 
their ideas in a “rational” way’ (Machin, 2013, p. 79-80). As Rotmans and Loorbach (2009, p. 
9) write: ‘Participants (...) must have the ability to look beyond their own domain or working 
area and be open-minded’.  
The idea that learning and dialogue, when organised adequately, will facilitate the 
development of common goals is of course a hopeful idea. However, how open and rational is 
deliberation really? As Amanda Machin (2013, p. 80) argues, ‘the deliberative democratic 
depiction of the discussion as free, equal and rational is misguided’. Even though deliberation 
can be much more inclusive than previously existing aggregative models of democracy, 
exclusion is unavoidable. Indeed, Flor Avelino (2009) has aptly shown how the actor selection 
process to partake in a transition arena is unavoidably exclusionary by expecting certain 
qualities from their participants. Carolyn Hendriks (Hendriks, 2009, p. 350) tells the following 
story to make a similar point: ‘when asked how members of the platforms were selected, one 
chair explained: “for the right solutions, we need the right knowledge”’. Transition management 
thus not only preselects its participants on the basis of an unrecognised, predefined vision of 
the common good, it also relies on a very specific notion of rational and capable subjectivity. 
Machin argues that arriving at inclusive agreements, including questions of sustainability, is 
impossible in the end, and therefore it is important to be aware of forms of power which are 
inevitably at play when taking decisions (Machin, 2013). Transition management recognises 
this to a certain extent by stating ‘that sustainability is an essentially contested notion’ 
(Loorbach and Rotmans, 2006, p. 13). However, its answer is that one should allow for 
‘diversity in the short term while trying to achieve consensus on long-term ambitions’. Still, as 
Mouffe argues, ‘every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony as a 
stabilisation of power that always entails some term of exclusion’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 104). 
Attempting to transcend power games through genuine dialogue is laudable, but power relations 
do not disappear by ignoring them. Indeed, ‘it is not enough to eliminate the political in its 
dimension of antagonism and exclusion from one's theory to make it vanish from the real world. 
It does come back, and with a vengeance’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 31). Interestingly, Elizabeth Shove 
and Gordon Walker make a similar observation in relation to transition management, as they 
write: ‘Even the most primitive attempt to establish starting assumptions would immediately 
reveal divisions and fractures between opposing interests and ideologies. Fundamental conflicts 
of this kind rarely figure in the rather ordered and consensual world presented by much of the 
transition management literature, this being a world in which “interactive strategy 
development” appears both possible and plausible’ (Shove and Walker, 2007, p. 4-5).  
In order to run smoothly, transition processes require that participants look beyond their 
own background and interests and arrive at an inclusive and open dialogue. Even to the extent 
that authority arguments and power games can be transcended through optimal group dynamics, 
however, power is never absent in such occasions. Here we not only refer to the power of one 
actor over another, but also to the power of one discourse over another. The way a problem is 
framed already implies certain issues are included and others are not. For example, while 
transition management advocates an inclusive, participatory approach, Berkhout et al. (2004) 
see the concept of a transition arena as contested. Power relations and different interests already 
play a role in the very formulation of the particular vision on how ‘transition’ is conceived of. 
In other words, in the construction of a discourse or vision, it is inevitable to include certain 
elements and others not.  
The point is that while inclusion is a laudable ideal, it is important to be aware of the 
fact that every discourse operates through in- and exclusions and that exclusion is therefore 
inevitable (Mouffe, 2000, p. 21). Exclusion is thus not a problem as such, as it is unavoidable, 
but it is important to recognise this.  
  
Recognising exclusion and creating spaces where it can be made visible makes it 
possible to develop more profound debates and oppositions, and to enhance a sensitivity to the 
fundamental political stakes. The problem is that a deliberative model of democracy, and surely 
the variant adopted by transition management, has difficulties accounting for the constitutive 
nature of conflict and exclusion. Therefore, Mouffe argues, an agonistic model of democracy 
is needed, which attributes a lot of importance to spaces where conflict and contestation can 
occur. Despite all critiques that can be formulated against it, the merit of the ‘old’ parliamentary 
model is precisely that it creates such spaces, including through the confrontation between 
majority and opposition. In the attempt to move beyond the deficiencies of parliamentarism, 
this key dimension is often downplayed. 
 
 
 
4.2. A guise of bottom-up processes and participation 
 
Transition management thus embraces a particular version of ‘governance’ through what they 
call ‘a representative participation from the four actor-groups (governmental bodies, business, 
NGOs and knowledge institutes/experts)’ (Loorbach, 2002, p. 6). Admittedly, this constitutes 
a relatively broad inclusion of a whole range of different actors. However the question imposes 
itself: where are ‘the people’, where are ‘the citizens’ in this approach? 
Instead of fully accounting for the representation of ‘the people’ in transition models, it 
is an elite of ‘important’ actors ‘with influence’ (Jones and De Meyere, 2009, p. 100), who have 
‘peculiar competencies and qualities’, who are considered ‘frontrunners’ and thus assumed to 
act as subjects of change (Rotmans and Loorbach, 2009, p. 6). Loorbach (2010) explains, 
‘participants are selected based on their specific roles, backgrounds and competences and their 
explicit ambition for innovation’ (Loorbach, 2007, p. 88).  Similarly, Rotmans and Loorbach 
(2009, p. 6) state: ‘[t]he focus on frontrunners is a key aspect of transition management. […] In 
the context of transition management, we mean by frontrunners agents with peculiar 
competencies and qualities: creative minds, strategists, and visionaries’. More concretely, 
actors involved in transition processes should have basic competences such as: to be able to 
‘think at a high level of abstraction [...], be able to communicate abstract ideas and have 
leadership abilities’ (Loorbach, 2007, p. 140). In addition, they need to be capable of 
‘implementing new policy designs’.  
 Sometimes it is supposed that these actors represent ‘the people’, but then in a non-
elected way (Berkhout et al., 2004;  see also Hendriks, 2009). Sometimes there is even no such 
representative claim at all. As Hendriks argues, it is ‘largely taken for granted that the visions 
and policies emerging from transition arenas will be accepted and deemed legitimate by the 
broader public’ (Hendriks, 2009, p. 343). And he adds: ‘getting the ‘right’ people to foster and 
stimulate innovation appears to have pushed aside democratic questions such as what kind of 
representation do we require, how will participants be held accountable and how will decisions 
be made and legitimised?’ (Hendriks, 2009, p. 349).1 Grin (2012, p. 75) also underlines that 
‘fora specifically created to legitimise transitions, such as transition arenas or experiments, are 
 
1 In so far as ‘the people’ have a place, it is mostly within governmentality models. Governmentality refers to 
practices through which conduct is governed with the aim of realising objectives on the level of a population 
(Burchell et al., 1992; Foucault, 1994). For instance, one can try to reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases 
by steering individual people’s behaviour in such a way that they see themselves as moral subjects who have to 
lower their own individual footprint. Not surprisingly, governmentality practices in sustainability matters often 
focus on forms of sustainable consumption (Kenis and Mathijs, 2012; Kenis and Lievens, 2015).  
 
  
deliberately composed in a way which cannot produce ex ante legitimacy: they tend to primarily 
involve actors who are a priori sympathetic to the idea of the transition.’ 
The point is that in a guise of bottom-up processes and participation, power is thus 
redistributed from ‘all citizens’ towards non-elected groups of ‘important’ and ‘innovative’ 
actors from a business, governmental, academic or civil society background. But there is more: 
as even international institutions such as the UN and the World Bank recognise, ‘the poor’ will 
be hit first and hardest by climate change. Yet, transition management barely takes this into 
account when composing its transition arenas. By excluding citizens from its arenas, the voices 
of people who are confronted daily with the first consequences of climate change tend to remain 
unheard. Indeed, a choice is made for what are currently perceived to be ‘important’ actors, 
who might often be actors who have a stronger interest in maintaining the status quo. Not only 
are particular voices excluded from the very beginning, these risk to be the voices of those who 
suffer most and first. Without any doubt, the concept of ‘sustainability’ and the pathways to 
realise it would get a complete different content if these actors would be given a central place. 
 
Sometimes it is argued that ‘citizen engagement […] is difficult because the public are ‘not that 
interested’ or because the issues at stake are ‘too complex for everyday citizens’ (Hendriks, 
2009, p. 351). A similar argument could of course be given for any type of democratic decision-
making, leading to the systematic exclusion of ‘popular’ interests.  The question is thus not only 
‘[w]hat about those who disagree’, as we elaborated in the previous section, but also, what about 
those ‘who are already excluded from participation’? (Machin, 2013, p. 62). 
Interestingly, even in critical accounts of transition management, the possible agency of 
citizens is not taken into account. If they have a role, it is limited to their status as consumers. 
For example, the Dutch Energy Transition Program mentions citizens as a ‘relevant “transition 
party”’ in the following way: ‘As a consumer, the citizen can play an important role in the 
success of the energy transitions by being more aware about energy and energy savings’ (ETF 
2006 in Hendriks, 2009, p. 351). The involvement of the citizens is thus reduced to their role 
of ‘informed consumers’ (Hendriks, 2009, p. 351). Similarly, both Gert Spaargaren (2003) and 
Shove and Walker (2007) criticise transition management for not taking the ‘end-users’ of new 
technologies into account. However, their criticism is oriented towards the negligence of people 
in their role as end-user consumers, while at the same time negating the role people can have 
as active agents in transition processes as such. Interestingly, as we will elaborate more 
profoundly in the next paragraph, transition management situates the possible actors of change 
almost exclusively within a market framework. It is as if there are two key ways to participate 
in a transition and two roles that are relevant in society: business leaders and consumers. In this 
way, transitions are locked in a liberal market model that does not acknowledge the need of its 
own transition. 
 
 
4.3. Market relations and the concealment of their political nature 
 
Despite a discourse on fundamental change, transition management stays within the confines 
of the predominant framework of the liberal market system. As Kemp en Loorbach explain: 
‘transition management [...] relies heavily on market forces for the delivery of functional 
services for the obvious reason that no authority can plan for the efficient delivery of specialised 
services’ (Kemp and Loorbach 2006:118).  
As René Kemp and his colleagues (Kemp et al., 2007a, p. 11) argue: ‘It is often 
insufficiently realised that the efficiency of markets rests on the weeding out of sub optimal 
designs of products and technologies through market competition. Evolutionary change, 
founded on trial and error, while wasteful in the short term, is often the most intelligent 
  
approach in the long run’. They conclude: ‘[t]his view greatly influenced the vision of transition 
management.’ The transition management model is thus without any doubt a market model 
which is based on competition, private entrepreneurship and market exchange. Admittedly, the 
market ought to be corrected in order to protect niches which are not competitive yet. While 
planning is rejected, a choice is made for ‘context control’ via specific measures. As Kemp and 
Loorbach (2006:118) write, ‘(t)ransition management does not blankly rely on market forces, 
but is concerned with the conditions under which market forces operate, by engaging in 
“context control” so as to orient market dynamics towards societal goals. The context control 
consists of regulations, economic instruments (the use of taxes, subsidies and emission trading), 
the use of policy goals and covenants and specific types of planning (such as land use 
planning)’.  
Importantly, the fact that transition management promotes a market approach is as such 
not significant, neither should it a priori be considered a problem. However, two points have to 
be made. To start with, it is questionable whether it is possible to reconcile the maintenance of 
a regime with its transformation, as, amongst others, Bulkeley et al (2013) aptly notice. First of 
all, ‘[i]nnovations build on existing ideas, values and technologies, so few of them are truly 
radical’ (Lovell 2009 in Bulkeley et al., 2013, p. 32). Second, ‘the key role ascribed to 
government actors in creating ‘protected’ spaces for niche development raises questions as to 
whether niches are established in order to maintain regimes rather than as a means of fostering 
change’ (Bulkeley et al., 2013, p. 32). The risk is thus that ‘radical, systems-wide sustainable 
development as a goal of transition management policies [is] exchange[d] for technology 
development, global competitiveness and economic growth on the way to implementation’  
(Voss et al., 2009, p. 289; see also Kern and Howlett, 2009; Paredis, 2011). 
A second problem is that transition management does not seem to recognise the 
ideological and political nature of this choice to build on a market framework. In this sense, 
transition management too easily overlooks the non-neutral ‘political’ assumptions of its own 
story. As Ivan Scrase and Adrian Smith (2009, p. 719) state: ‘TM [transition management] ideas 
are presented, as the name suggests, as managerial governance rather than politics’. Or as 
Hendriks (2009, p. 352) argues: its ‘accountability is understood largely as a 
managerial/administrative phenomenon that is about producing effective long-term transitions’.  
According to Slavoj Žižek (2009), presenting itself as non-ideological is precisely the 
masterstroke of ideology. The dominant ideology is the one that succeeds in presenting itself 
as the opposite of ideology: as management or administration, as neutral science or technique, 
or as the indisputable result of dialogue or deliberation. He considers this as the paradox of our 
time: no discourse is so ideological as that of the market, but it succeeds very well in presenting 
itself as non-ideological. Or, in the words of Swyngedouw (2010): the dominant way to 
conceive of sustainability transitions is as ‘radical techno-managerial and socio-cultural 
transformations, organised within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute’. In 
other words, radical and urgent change is called for, but only in such a way that fundamental 
parameters of the market society do not have to change.  
Transition management risks to be an almost prototypical example of this. Indeed, 
transition management has a radical side to it, at least in its discourse. Its proponents argue for 
‘radical, systems-wide sustainable development’, for example (Voß et al., 2009, p. 289). 
However, if one takes a closer look at how this system change is understood, many things 
apparently fall outside the scope of the system that has to be changed. What needs to change, 
is limited to particular market logics that should be steered in a more sustainable direction. 
 
Interestingly, while transition management has developed an impressive terminology to 
describe ‘system’ features, it seems to remain blind for the non-articulated market paradigm of 
its own discourse. While Rotmans et al. (2001b, p. 16) define a transition as ‘a gradual, 
  
continuous process of change where the structural character of a society (or a complex sub-
system of society) transforms’ – a definition that may refer to any societal change – in actual 
facts most transition management authors limit themselves to socio-technological changes (e.g., 
Genus and Coles, 2008) within an incontestable market paradigm. In other words, they 
formulate alternatives within the framework of what currently exists. The result, however, is 
that there is ‘no properly “agonistic” debate in the democratic political public sphere about 
possible alternatives to the existing hegemonic order’ (Mouffe, 2002).  
This does not mean that transition theory would not be an accurate representation of 
how some transitions have happened in the past, or still happen today. Indeed, the liberal market 
economy can be seen as a key characteristic of the current ‘landscape’. The crucial question, 
however, is how this implicit choice to maintain the market impacts transition management’s 
capacity to realise sustainability both in an effective and democratic way. In other words, the 
question is whether it is possible at all to realise an effective sustainability transition without 
questioning the way society is organised today. Indeed, in so far as current ecological crises are 
not in the first place crises of nature, but crises of society and how the latter relates to its 
ecological conditions (Brunnengräber, 2007; Foster et al., 2010), tackling these crises requires 
social, economic and, especially, ‘political’ change. Or, in other words, by misrecognising the 
contingency of the current way in which society is organised, and its historically specific 
relation to nature, one risks to stay blind for the root causes of the crisis, while investigating 
these is a crucial precondition for tackling them in an effective way.  
There are many arguments to conceive key ingredients of the transition management 
approach (e.g., competition, economic growth, …) as fundamental mechanisms which are co-
responsible for the current ecological crises (Kenis and Lievens, 2015). For instance, an 
increasing number of scholars argues that from an ecological perspective, real transition should 
explore pathways beyond the growth paradigm (Foster, 2002; Foster et al., 2010; Jackson, 
2009). However, the ecological impact of economic growth represents just one of the obstacles 
to sustainability that any market-oriented transition will be confronted with.  
 
Of course, the crucial question is: what does this mean for transition management? This can be 
illustrated with a simple example. From the perspective of transition management, a 
breakthrough of the niche of electric cars would be a big step forward. However, would this 
matter if each year, more cars are sold, as the growth paradigm would dictate? The production 
of a car requires a huge amount of energy and scarce natural resources. A growing number of 
cars necessitates the construction of more roads, and even if electricity can be produced in a 
relatively sustainable way, increasing electricity demand still requires an ever higher input of 
materials and energy for building the installations that produce this energy. Moreover, electric 
or not: cars have relatively short life cycles, leading to a massive amount of waste. The 
implications are paramount: can we realise sustainability while continuing to grow 
economically? Can we find innovative technological solutions for all problems? Is the creation 
of new commodities an adequate strategy towards sustainability?  
Remaining within the hegemonic framework of the liberal-democratic growth-based 
market economy and its post-political ideology threatens to be a key obstacle to realise a proper 
sustainability transition, as the latter circumvents from the need to move beyond merely 
‘evolutionary’ change.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As transition management tends to bear the hallmark of the post-political consensus, the critique 
of this consensus challenges its core. To end where we started: to what extent is the act of 
  
framing oneself as ‘new’, and oppositional voices as ‘old’, not already a post-political 
representation of the environmental terrain? Is a real political and ideological discussion not 
avoided in this way? And, what does this mean for the possibilities of transition management 
to realise sustainability change?  
Indeed, transition management tends to represent society in deliberative, market and 
‘managerial’ terms, and thereby contributes to a depoliticised understanding of sustainable 
change. But the crucial question is of course why does it matter? Why are we concerned about 
this question of post-politics or depoliticisation in the first place? Within the scope of this 
conclusion, we want to point to a twofold relevance. First, taking ‘the political’ into account is 
a foundation stone for democracy. As scholars such as Mouffe have aptly shown, the ideal of 
inclusive deliberation amongst partners does not fulfil this criterion. Democracy turns out to be 
a much complicated and sophisticated issue. Second, taking the ‘political’ into account is 
important from the perspective of the effectiveness of sustainability transition projects. Insofar 
as politicisation helps to reveal the root causes of ecological destruction, it is crucial for tackling 
these problems in an effective way.  
Related to these both issues, acknowledging conflict, contradictory interests and radical 
forms of pluralism is a condition for avoiding that large parts of citizens become alienated from 
transition discourses elaborated by enlightened elites. This is not only crucial from a democratic 
point of view, but it is also a reason why politicisation can be important for tackling ecological 
challenges in an effective way. Without broad ‘popular’ support, a transition to another, more 
sustainable world becomes at least unlikely. It is therefore far from innocent to depoliticise the 
debate on pathways towards sustainability change. 
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